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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN BUSINESS LAW
Jack Morton* and Roger Barber**
INTRODUCTION
Writing a survey article in business law is an almost impossible
task. Much of the law affecting business is relatively fixed. The
Uniform Partnership Act, the Uniform Commercial Code and the
Model Corporation Act, for example, have remained relatively in-
tact in recent years. Other areas of business law, however, have been
going through an upheaval since 1970. The increasing breadth and
complexity of business transactions, as well as criticism of existing
business practices have resulted in countless new statutes and regu-
lations being passed each year.
Since the restraints of time and space precluded covering all
the new developments in business law, we decided to concentrate
this article on the area we feel has had the most significant effect
on business people in recent years: consumer law. The recent devel-
opments in consumer law have redefined the bargaining power of
consumers and, as a result, have totally changed the way business
people conduct themselves in the area.
Since both the federal government and the State of Montana
have enacted significant legislation in the area of consumer law, this
article has accordingly been divided into two parts. Part I, will cover
the major federal developments; Part II, the major Montana devel-
opments.' Part II will also include a brief discussion of several new
state laws strengthening the rights of employees since it was felt
that these laws have also had a significant effect on Montana busi-
ness law.
The article has been limited principally to a discussion of stat-
utes. A few important administrative regulations implementing the
statutes have also been included. There is no case law discussion
since most of the statutes are so new that there are no significant
court interpretations of the developments yet in existence.
* B.A., University of Montana, 1968; J.D., University of Montana, 1971.
** B.A., University of Montana, 1967; J.D., University of Montana, 1971.
1. Part I was written by Jack Morton, Assistant Professor of Business Law at the School
of Business Administration, University of Montana. Part II was written by Roger Barber,
Assistant Professor of Business Law at the School of Business Administration, University of
Montana. The authors would like to thank Susan Lacosta, the Montana Law Review member
who was assigned to help us with the preparation of this article; Susan wrote the section on
Equal Credit Opportunity Act.
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Several recent antitrust developments have significantly af-
fected consumer law. In 1975, Congress passed the Consumer
Goods Pricing Act,' putting an end to the costly, inefficient practice
of allowing manufacturers to establish retail prices for their goods,
otherwise called "fair trading." 3 The Consumer Goods Pricing Act
repealed both the 1937 Miller-Tydings Act and the 1952 McGuire
Act. The Miller-Tydings Act had exempted state laws on fair trad-
ing from the provisions of the Sherman Antitrust Act, while the
McGuire Act had allowed the states to pass fair trade laws which
were controlling even over non-cooperative merchants.'
The 94th Congress also made a substantial change in the en-
forcement of the Sherman Antitrust Act. The Hart-Scott-Rodino
Antitrust Improvement Act of 19765 extended to each state attorney
general the authority to:
bring a civil action in the name of such State, in any district court
of the United States having jurisdiction of the defendant, to secure
monetary relief as provided in this section for injury sustained by
such natural persons to their property by reason of any violation
of the Sherman Act. 6
The Act does not require the attorney general to give actual notice
to the consumers or to get their consent before bringing an action,,
but he is required to give reasonable constructive notice by publica-
tion to all affected consumers. The court has the authority to deter-
mine the method of publication as well as to determine whether any
additional notice to the consumers is necessary.' The Act also allows
the attorney general to recover attorney's fees and treble damages.,
The court can deny damages and grant reasonable attorney's fees
2. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. V 1975).
3. Fair trading had raised the price of some goods by 18-27%. S. REP. No. 94-466, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprinted in [19741 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1569, 1572. It must be
noted that while the Consumer Goods Pricing Act does prohibit "fair trading," it does not
affect the practice of placing "suggested price" labels on merchandise.
4. Congress had passed the McGuire Act in response to Schwegman Bros. v. Calvert
Distillers Corp., 314 U.S. 384 (1951), which has held that manufacturers could not enforce
fair trading upon non-cooperative merchants.
5. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (Supp. VI 1976).
6. Id. § 15(C)(a)(1).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 15(C)(b)(1) (Supp. VI 1976).
8. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (Supp. VI 1976). The various state attorneys general have shown little
hesitancy to utilize this new enforcement tool. Among suits brought under the act are actions
by attorneys general in Arizona, California, Connecticut, Florida, Kansas, Oregon and Wash-
ington against various major oil companies.
9. 15 U.S.C. § 15(C)(a)(2) (Supp. VI 1976).
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to a "prevailing defendant upon a finding that the State attorney
general has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppres-
sive reasons."10 (emphasis added).
B. Fair Credit Reporting Act
With the widespread use of consumer credit reports, concern
about the individual's right of privacy resulted in Congress adopting
the Fair Credit Reporting Act in 1970." Since the Federal Fair
Credit Reporting Act and the Montana Fair Credit Reporting Act
are virtually identical, a discussion of the Act has been left to Part
II.
C. The Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Improvement
Act
Finding the state laws on warranty protection to be inadequate,
Congress entered the consumer warranty field in 1975 with the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act."2 The legislation deals only with
written warranties and attempts to insure that written warranties
are clear, complete, understandable, and equitable. 3
The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act applies to any transaction
involving the purchase of a consumer product, other than for pur-
poses of resale. A consumer product is broadly defined as "any
tangible personal property which is. . . normally used for personal,
family, or household purposes (including any property to be at-
tached to or installed in any real property without regard to whether
it is so attached or installed.)"' 4
Any written warranty on a consumer product costing the buyer
more than fifteen dollars' must clearly and conspicuously disclose
the following: (1) the identity of the parties to whom the warranty
10. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (C)(d)(2) (Supp. VI 1976).
11. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1970).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 2301 (Supp. V 1975). The Act's complete name is Magnuson-Moss
Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act. Title I of the Act deals with con-
sumer product warranties while Title II alters the powers of the Federal Trade Commission.
This discussion will deal only with the provisions of Title I.
13. H.R. REP. No. 93-1107, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG.,
& AD. NEWS, 7702-54. From the legislative history of the Act making repeated reference to
the manufacturer's tactic of concealing an implied warranty disclaimer within an expressed
warranty statement, it is apparent that Congress was particularly concerned with eliminating
this practice.
14. 15 U.S.C. § 2301(1) (Supp. V 1975). Thus, the type of product rather than the
identity of the purchaser determines whether the Act applies. Businesses buying goods for
office or plant use will be protected under the Act as long as the goods are of the type which
are normally used for personal, family or household purposes.
15. Although 15 U.S.C. § 2302(e) (Supp. V 1975) provides for such disclosure on items
costing over five dollars, the FTC chose to include only items costing more than fifteen
dollars. 16 C.F.R. § 701.3(a) (1977).
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is extended;" (2) the products, parts, characteristics, or components
covered by the warranty; 7 (3) a statement of what the warrantor
will do if the warranty is breached;' (4) the duration of the war-
ranty;"' and (5) a step-by-step description of the process that the
consumer should follow in obtaining satisfaction in a warranty dis-
pute." In addition, the disclosure statement must include the fol-
lowing language: "This warranty gives you specific legal rights, and
you may also have other rights which vary from state to state."'9
Most consumers have faced the problem of buying a packaged
item marked "guaranteed," but being unable to read the details of
the packaged warranty until after the purchase. The Act requires
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to adopt regulations insuring
that the written warranties be available to the consumer prior to the
sale. 22 The FTC pre-sale availability regulations apply only to con-
sumer products costing more than fifteen dollars.23 The seller must
conspicuously display the warranty24 or a text of the warranty 2 by
maintaining readily accessible binders containing the warranties
near the product.26 He may make the warranty material available
in photographic form on either microfiche or ultrafiche viewing
machines.27 Catalog, mail order firms, and door-to-door sellers must
notify buyers that copies of the warranties are available for inspec-
tion upon the buyer's request.8
The Act also requires written warranties on consumer products
to be designated as either full warranties or limited warranties. 2 In
order to be labeled a full warranty, the warrantor must agree to
repair or replace the product, or provide the buyer with a refund of
the purchase price less reasonable depreciation, if the product does
not meet the warranty specifications. 0 A full warranty cannot limit
the duration of any implied warranties on the product,3 but it may
16. 16 C.F.R. § 701.3(a)(1) (1977).
17. 16 C.F.R. § 701.3(a)(2) (1977).
18. 16 C.F.R. § 701.3(a)(3) (1977).
19. 16 C.F.R. § 701.3(a)(4) (1977).
20. 16 C.F.R. § 701.3(a)(5) (1977). The statement must include the warrantor's mailing
address, the name or title and address of the employee or department of the warrantor
responsible for warranty obligations, or a toll-free phone number which the consumer may
use to obtain this information.
21. 16 C.F.R. § 701.3(a)(9) (1977).
22. 15 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1975).
23. 16 C.F.R. § 702.3 (1977).
24. 16 C.F.R. § 702.3(a)(1)(i) (1977).
25. 16 C.F.R. § 702.3(a)(1)(iv) (1977).
26. 16 C.F.R. § 702.3(a)(1)(ii) (1977).
27. 41 Fed. Reg. 53,472 (1976); 42 Fed. Reg. 15,679 (1977).
28. 16 C.F.R. § 702.3(c) (1977).
29. 15 U.S.C. § 2303(a) (Supp. V 1975).
30. 15 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(1) (Supp. V 1975).
31. 15 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(2) (Supp. V 1975).
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limit the consequential damages if such limitation appears conspic-
uously on the face of the warranty.32 Any written warranty which
fails to meet these standards must be conspicuously designated a
limited warranty.33 While no person granting a written warranty on
a consumer product is allowed to disclaim any of the implied war-
ranties, 4 a person giving a limited warranty may limit the duration
of the implied warranties."'
The Act also encourages, but does not require, warrantors to
establish informal warranty dispute settlement procedures as an
alternative to court action. 31 If a warrantor or group of warrantors
has established such a complaint procedure, no civil action, other
than class actions, can be initiated against the warrantor unless the
buyer has first complied with the informal procedures.37
D. The Equal Credit Opportunity Act
Recognizing credit's growing economic importance, the 1972
National Commission on Consumer Finance requested legislation to
insure that every consumer should have equal access to the credit
market. 8 The commission's investigations had shown that many
consumers, particularly women, 39 were being denied credit because
of their membership in a class rather than because of any individual
lack of credit worthiness. 0 Congress, in response, passed the Equal
Credit Opportunity Act in 1974.1' It amended the Act in 1976.42
32. 15 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(3) (Supp. V 1975).
33. 15 U.S.C. § 2303(a)(2) (Supp. V 1975).
34. 15 U.S.C. § 2308(a) (Supp. V 1975).
35. 15 U.S.C. § 2308(b) (Supp. V 1975). It appears obvious, however, from the prolifera-
tion of limited warranties that Congress greatly underestimated the ability of American
businesses to sell products which have the dubious distinction of carrying the label "limited
warranty."
36. 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(1) (Supp. V 1975).
37. 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(3) (Supp. V 1975). However, the FTC has set such elaborate
standards for informal warranty complaint procedures that warrantors will find them too
expensive to set up.
38. NAT'L COMM'N ON CONSUMER FINANCE, CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE UNITED STATES 151
(1972).
39. The problems of women identified by the Commission included the following:
(a) Single women had more trouble obtaining credit than single men.
(b) Married women were required to reapply for credit.
(c) Married women were unable to establish credit in their own names.
(d) The wife's income would not be counted when a married couple applied for
credit.
(e) Divorced, separated and widowed women were unable to establish credit be-
cause prior accounts were in the husband's name.
40. See NAT'L COMM'N ON CONSUMER FINANCE, supra note 38, at 152-53. These problems
first received nationwide attention after a hearing held by the Commission in May 1972. See
id. at 151-60. Congressional committees reporting later on proposed legislation voiced similar
concerns. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 93-278, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1973).
41. Act of Oct. 28, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-495, 88 Stat. 1521 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1691
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The Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 1974 was the first compre-
hensive legislative attempt to prevent credit discrimination. It pro-
hibits discrimination by a creditor "against any applicant on the
basis of sex or marital status with respect to any aspect of a credit
transaction."4" The 1976 amendments expanded the scope of prohib-
ited discriminations to include race, color, religion, national origin,
age" and receipt of public assistance." Discrimination based upon
the good faith exercise of rights under the Consumer Credit Act is
also forbidden.4"
The Act authorizes the Federal Reserve Board to make any
regulations necessary to carry out the purpose of the legislation.47
The regulations are collectively known as Regulation B. To elimi-
nate discrimination on the basis of sex or marital status, Regulation
B prohibits the consideration of certain factors in decisions by credi-
tors to extend credit. Creditors generally may not make inquiries as
to the applicant's marital status.49 They cannot request and con-
sider information concerning the applicant's spouse unless that
spouse will be permitted to use the account or will be contractually
liable for the account, or the applicant is relying on community
property, the other spouse's income, alimony, child support or
maintenance payments as a basis for repayment." They cannot
make inquiries about or consider the applicant's birth control prac-
tices or child bearing intentions."
Regulation B also requires creditors to determine whether the
account is one for which both spouses will be contractually liable
and, if so, to designate the account to reflect the participation of
(Supp. V 1975)).
42. Act of Mar. 23, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-239, 90 Stat. 251 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 1691).
43. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a) (Supp. V 1975).
44. Pub. L. No. 94-239, 90 Stat. 251 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a) (1)).
45. Pub. L. No. 94-239, 90 Stat. 251 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a) (2)).
46. Pub. L. No. 94-239, 90 Stat. 251 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(3)). The
Consumer Credit Protection Act is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (Supp. V 1975). The Act
grants consumers the right to sue for actual and punitive damages if a creditor fails to disclose
the terms of the credit transaction as required by the Act, id., § 1640, or if a creditor reports
unauthorized or inaccurate credit information, id., § 1681.
47. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(b).
48. Federal Reserve Board Regulation B, 12 C.F.R. § 202 (1976) (hereinafter cited as
Reg. B).
49. Reg. B, § 202.4(c)(1). The provision states that a creditor shall not ask marital
status if the applicant applies for an unsecured separate account except in a community
property state or as required to comply with state law governing permissible finance charges
or loan ceilings. In inquiring as to marital status, only the use of the three terms: "married,"
"unmarried," or "separated," is permissible. Reg. B, § 202.4(c)(2). If the applicant uses terms
such as Mr. or Mrs., the creditor must state "conspicuously" that such terms are only
optional. Reg. B, § 202.4(c)(4).
50. Reg. B, § 202.5(b).
51. Reg. B, § 202.5(h). 6
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both spouses. 2 To alleviate the problem of married women with no
credit history of their own, the creditor is allowed to utilize previous
joint accounts in evaluating the application of one spouse, provided
he takes cognizance of any special information provided by the ap-
plicant., :'
With respect to sex and marital status, certain practices not
actually a part of the determination of creditworthiness are recog-
nized and prohibited by the regulations. A creditor, for example,
may not refuse to use an applicant's maiden name."4 Likewise, the
signature of the other spouse may not be required unless necessary
to preserve or protect the creditor's rights.55 Where the need for a
signature is questionable, the creditor is authorized to request it.'"
Where there has been a change in name or marital status, the credi-
tor may not require reapplication, change the terms, or terminate
the account, unless there is evidence of an inability or unwillingness
to repay. 7 Where prohibited information is retained in a creditor's
files, but is not used by the creditor, no violation will exist provided
the information was obtained from any source prior to June 30, 1976,
or at any time from a credit reporting agency. It is also not a viola-
tion if the information was obtained at any time from the applicant
or others without a specific request by the creditor."
Unless application is made by telephone or orally for an exten-
sion of an existing open-ended credit plan, the applicant must be
provided with a written statement informing him that discrimina-
tion is prohibited and of the appropriate agency charged with en-
forcing the Act.59 Where adverse action is taken on an application,
the creditor must furnish the applicant with a written statement of
the reasons for credit denial.'" This obligation is satisfied by provid-
ing a written statement of reasons or by giving written notice of
adverse action which advises the applicant that he has the right to
know why the action was taken and where that information may be
obtained.'
Regulation B requires a creditor to preserve a copy of each
application and any notations used in the evaluation process for a
52. Reg. B, § 202.6(a)(1)(i)-(ii).
53. Reg. B, § 202.5(j).
54. Reg. B, § 202.4(e).
55. Reg. B, § 202.7(b)(c). Creditors' rights which would involve the spouse are the rights
to create a valid lien, pass clear title, waive inchoate rights to property or assign earnings,
for example.
56. Federal Reserve Board Letter No. 52 (Feb. 20, 1976).
57. Reg. B, § 202.4(a).
58. Reg. B, § 202.5(k).
59. Reg. B, § 202.4(d).
60. Reg. B, § 202.5(m).
61. Pub. L. No. 94-239, § 2, 90 Stat. 251 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1691(d)(2)).
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period of 25 months after action is taken on the application. Notifi-
cation of adverse action and any statement alleging discrimination,
submitted in writing by the applicant, must be retained for the
same period of time."' Where a creditor has notice that he is under
investigation, his records must be preserved until a final disposition
of the matter is made.6 4
Congress gave the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) the major
responsibility for enforcement of the Act,"5 subject to the jurisdic-
tion of other agencies in certain specialized areas. 6 A violation of
the Act is considered a violation of the Federal Trade Commission
Act. 7 The FTC can issue cease and desist orders for violations of the
Act. 5 The United States Attorney General can also enforce the Act,
and is authorized to seek injunctive or other appropriate relief, 9 and
to commence civil actions in "pattern and practice" cases on his
own initiative7 or on referral from the administrative agencies re-
sponsible for enforcement.7
Additionally, an aggrieved applicant himself may institute pro-
ceedings for preventive relief in the form of an injunction or a re-
straining order.72 The applicant may also institute proceedings to
recover actual and punitive damages in an individual capacity or as
the representative of a class. 3 The 1976 amendments raised the
ceiling of potential recovery of punitive damages in a class action
to the "lesser of $500,000 or one per centum of the net worth of the
62. 42 Fed. Reg. 1261 (1977) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 202.12(b)).
63. Reg. B, § 202.4.
64. Id.
65. 15 U.S.C. § 1691c(c) (Supp. V 1975).
66. 15 U.S.C. § 1691c(a)(1)-(9). Administrative enforcement of the Act with respect to
certain creditors is assigned to the Comptroller of the Currency, the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System, the Board of Directors of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, and Administrator of the National Credit Union
Administration, the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Civil Aeronautics Board, the
Secretary of Agriculture, the Farm Credit Administration, the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission and the Small Business Administration. 15 U.S.C. § 1691c(a)(1)-(9). It was necessary
to delegate parallel authority to these institutions because the FTC does not have jurisdiction
over banking institutions. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970). See also 15 U.S.C. § 1691c(b) (Supp. V 1975).
Any violation of the regulations of the agencies is deemed to be a violation of the Act itself.
67. 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1970).
68. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b). In the case of noncompliance with an order of the Commission,
violators are subject to a civil penalty of not more than $5,000. 15 U.S.C. § 45(1). Other
agencies entrusted with administrative enforcement powers have the same problem. See, e.g.,
12 U.S.C. § 1818(b) (1970).
69. Pub. L. No. 94-239, § 6, 90 Stat. 253 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(h)).
70. Id. "Pattern and practice" suits refer to those cases in which a creditor discrimi-
nates against certain kinds of applicants on a regular basis.
71. Pub. L. No. 94-239, § 6, 90 Stat. 253 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(g)).
72. Pub. L. No. 94-239, § 6, 90 Stat. 253 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(d)).
73. Pub. L. No. 94-239, § 6, 90 Stat. 253 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(a)-(c)).
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creditor."74 Court costs and reasonable attorney fees are to be a part
of any damages awarded."
The Act, as amended, provides for a two year statute of limita-
tions period,7" running from the time the violation occurs." It also
provides that where the responsible agency or the attorney general
commences an action under the Act, the limitation period for civil
actions pertaining to those violations starts to run with the com-
mencement of such action.7 8
E. Federal Trade Commission
One of the more significant administrative regulations to ap-
pear in recent years is the Federal Trade Commission's (FTC) ruling
involving the preservation of consumer defenses." The FTC had
recognized that in all too many situations, the consumer's obliga-
tion to pay for goods or services had been separated from the mer-
chant's obligations to deliver those goods or services. 0
Two independent but similar legal principles have been respon-
sible for this separation. The first involves the holder in due course
concept which was first elaborated in Miller v. Race.81 The case held
that the purchaser of a negotiable instrument did not insure per-
formance of the seller's underlying obligation. This concept formed
the foundation of the English Bills of Exchange Act (1882), the
Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law (1896), and the present Uni-
form Commercial Code's article on commercial paper. 82 Under these
statutes, the assignee of a negotiable instrument would invariably
qualify as a holder in due course.83 As a holder in due course, the
assignee was immune from all defenses which the consumer may
have had, except for infancy, illegality, and fraud in the execution.8 4
The second principle which protected the assignee from any
claims of the consumer was the waiver of defenses clause commonly
found in many installment contracts. The following is an example
of such a clause: "Buyer hereby waives and agrees not to assert
against the Assignee any defenses to the enforcement of this con-
74. Pub. L. No. 94-239, § 6, 90 Stat. 253 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(b)).
75. Pub. L. No. 94-239, § 6, 90 Stat. 253 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(d)).
76. Pub. L. No. 94-239, § 6, 90 Stat. 253 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(f)).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. 16 C.F.R. § 433 (1977).
80. NAT'L COMM'N ON CONSUMER FINANCE, supra note 38 at 16-17. The occurrence of such
transactions should not be underestimated; installment payments claim nearly one-
seventieth of the monthly disposable budgets of half the families in America.
81. 97 Eng. Rep. 398 (1758).
82. U.C.C. §§ 3-302, 3-305.
83. U.C.C. § 3-302.
84. U.C.C. § 3-305(2).
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tract now existing or which hereafter may arise."
In states where the courts or legislatures had restricted the use
in consumer transactions of the holder in due course concept and
the waiver of defenses clause, sellers had found vendor-related fi-
nancing, or "body dragging," to be a satisfactory alternative. Sellers
merely arranged for a direct loan between the consumer and a finan-
cial institution. The financial institution was thus insulated from
any complaints which the consumer may have had against the
seller.
These principles resulted in the holder in due course of a con-
sumer's note, the assignee of a contract containing the waiver of
defenses clause, and the financial institution which had loaned the
money to the consumer, being able to collect from the consumer
before the original seller could. The effect was to separate the con-
sumer's obligation to pay from the seller's obligation to deliver the
proper goods or perform certain services.
The FTC rule regarding the preservation of consumer defenses
became effective on May 15, 1976. The purpose of the rule is to
subject all creditors to any defenses which the consumer may have.
The rule requires all consumer credit contracts to contain a clear
statement that any holder of the contract is subject to all claims and
defenses which the consumer could assert against the seller of the
goods or services. 5 While the final version of the rule does not at-
tempt to distinguish between negotiable instruments and contracts
which contain waivers, the statement that the holder is subject to
all defenses which are available to the consumer is sufficient to
cover both situations.
The rule protects only consumers who are natural persons and
who purchase the goods or services for personal, family, or house-
hold use. 81 It does not protect such consumers as partnerships, cor-
porations, and governmental bodies, nor does it include real estate
transactions. The rule specifically exempts transactions involving
credit cards.87
Although the new rule does much to provide needed consumer
protection, it fails to solve the "body-dragging" or referral loan situ-
ation in which the seller simply refers the consumer to a lending
institution which makes the loan. It appears that this failure was
an oversight since the original rule was apparently intended to cover
the vendor-related financing problem. The definitions support this
conclusion since they define both purchase money loans and credi-
85. 16 C.F.R. § 433.1 (1977).
86. 16 C.F.R. § 433.2.
87. 16 C.F.R. § 433.1(c).
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tors who lend purchase money or finance sales of goods or services."
To correct this deficiency, the FTC, on November 14, 1975,
issued a notice of its intention to extend the coverage of the present
rule to include sellers as well as creditors. 9 The proposed modifica-
tion, if adopted, would make it an unfair trade practice for either a
seller or a creditor to accept a consumer contract which does not
include a notice statement eliminating the waiver clause and the
holder in due course concept.
II. MONTANA DEVELOPMENTS
A. Montana Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act
The federal government has had the authority to protect con-
sumers for more than 60 years. Congress passed the Federal Trade
Commission Act in 1914,90 creating the Federal Trade Commission
and giving it the power to prevent unfair trade practices . ' A paral-
lel authority did not exist in Montana until 1973 when the Montana
Unfair Practices and Consumer Protection Act was passed." Before
1973, Montana consumers had been protected only by the tradi-
tional contract or warranty enforcement remedies.
The Montana legislation declares that "[u]nfair methods of
competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct
of any trade or commerce" are illegal.2 The language is taken al-
most verbatim from the Federal Trade Commission Act. 3 Since the
federal government has had several decades to interpret its lan-
guage, Montana consumers and lawyers are told, by statute, to draw
on that background by giving "due consideration and weight" to the
interpretations of the Federal Trade Commission and the federal
courts ."
The Department of Business Regulation is authorized to adopt
rules and regulations for enforcement of the Montana Act,95 and has
88. 16 C.F.R. § 433.1(c), (d), (e).
89. 40 Fed. Reg. 53, 506 (1975).
90. Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, Pub. L. No. 63-203, 38 Stat. 717 (codified
at 15 U.S.C. 88 41-77 (1970)).
90.5. 15 U.S.C. 88 41, 45(a)(1) (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
91. Ch. 275, Laws of Montana (1973) (codified in REvsED CODES OF MONTANA [here-
inafter cited as R.C.M. 19471, § 85-401 to 418 (Supp. 1977)).
92. R.C.M. 1947, § 85-402 (Supp. 1977).
93. Section 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act states that "[u]nfair meth-
ods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or
affecting commerce, are declared illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1970).
94. R.C.M. 1947, § 85-403 (Supp. 1977). The FTC and the Federal courts have used
Section 5 language to prohibit false and misleading advertising, deceptive pricing practices,
mislabeling of products, agreements not to compete, games of chance, false testimonials,
buying clubs and distortions of competitors' products. For more precise information of the
19781
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promulgated some administrative regulations on the subject since
1975. 1 It is unfair and deceptive to misrepresent an item's brand,
manufacturer or place of manufacture, or to claim that secondhand
or restored goods are new. 7 When merchandise is advertised for sale,
the seller must have reasonable amounts of the item, or disclose that
he only has a limited supply. The seller cannot play the old "bait
and switch" game, drawing the consumer into the store for a bar-
gain, and then disparaging the bargain item or refusing to sell it
according to the terms advertised." If a product is "free," all terms
and conditions attached to the offer must be revealed at the outset
to indicate to the consumer how "free" an item really is.'00 If an item
is offered at a "bargain" price, then it must be sold for less than its
regular price, and it must be sold for less than ". . . the price at
which substantial sales of the article are being made in the area;
"101
The department has also promulgated regulations governing
the motor vehicle repair business. The regulations define charging
a consumer for parts and repairs that have not been expressly au-
thorized by him,' 02 or alleging that certain parts and repairs are
necessary, when in fact they are not, as unfair and deceptive prac-
tices. 10 3 The regulations establish a procedure for estimating and
performing repairs and services on motor vehicles. 104 If the customer
requests one, a written estimate of the repairs, maintenance or serv-
ice on a motor vehicle must be provided, but the repairs or services
must cost more than $50 before the request must be honored. If
given, the estimate is valid for five days, or for a lesser period, if so
specified in the written estimate.'0 The estimate should include the
costs of all parts, labor and storage, and the approximate date of
completion of the work. If actual labor and parts cost ten percent
or $25 more than the estimated price (whichever is greater), ' the
consumer must consent to the additional charge before the work is
performed. 17
meaning of "unfair and deceptive," see, i5 U.S.C. §§ 45-58 (Supp. V 1975) and 16 C.F.R. §§
15.1-15.491 (1977).
95. R.C.M. 1947, § 85-403(2) (Supp. 1977).
96. ADMINISTRATIVE RULES OF MONTANA [hereinafter cited as A.R.M.] §§ 8-2.4-S400 and
2.4(2)-S400 (1976).
97. A.R.M. § 8-2.4(1)(a)(b)(d)(f)-S400 (1976).
98. A.R.M. § 8-2.4(1)-S400(i) (1976).
99. A.R.M. § 8-2.4(1)-S400(m) (1976).
100. A.R.M. § 8-2.4(1)-S400(o) (1976).
101. A.R.M. § 8- 2 .4 (1)-S 4 0 0 (p) (1976).
102. A.R.M. § 8-2.4(2)-S430(2) (1976).
103. A.R.M. § 8-2.4(2)-S430(4) (1976).
104. A.R.M. § 8-2.4(2)-S420 (1976).
105. A.R.M. § 8-2.4(2)-S420(1) (1976).
106. In other words, if an estimate of $250 is returned on repair work, the mechanic may
[Vol. 39
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All repair work must be recorded on an invoice, and if any
reconditioned or rebuilt parts are used, that fact must also be noted
on the invoice.""r Replaced parts must be returned to the customer,
if he requests them. However, it is not necessary to comply with the
return request if the parts must be returned to a manufacturer
under a warranty arrangement, or if their return is impracticable
because of size and weight, for example.'"' The department has also
adopted regulations to limit deception in the sale of motor vehicles",
and to monitor and license proprietary schools."'
To enforce the Act, the Department of Business Regulation has
the authority to seek injunctive relief to restrain unfair and decep-
tive acts." 2 A court, granting an injunction, can assess a civil pen-
alty of $500 per violation against the offender if it finds that he has
willfully used unfair or deceptive trade practices." ' If it finds that
the businessperson's conduct involves fraud, the offender can be
fined up to $2,000, imprisoned for more than a year, or both."4 The
courts may also make any additional orders or judgments that seem
appropriate, including appointment of receivers, restoration of
property to the proper person, and revocation of business licenses
or professional certification."' Any businessperson who ignores an
injunction is subject to a civil penalty of not more than $10,000 per
violation,"' and to suspension or forfeiture of any corporate fran-
chise he may have."7
Additionally, the Department of Business Regulation can uti-
lize the traditional administrative remedy of voluntary compliance.
The accused's statement of compliance must be written and filed
with the appropriate state district court."8 It is not treated as an
admission of wrongdoing."'
County attorneys can assist the Department of Business Regu-
charge for additional necessary parts and labor up to $275. Above that price, the mechanic
must receive permission from the consumer before the work can be performed.
107. A.R.M. § 8-2.4(2)-S420 (1976).
108. A.R.M. § 8-2.4(2)-S420(2) (1976).
109. A.R.M. § 8-2.4(2)-S420(3) (1976).
110. A.R.M. § 8-2.4(2)-S420 (1976).
111. A.R.M. § 8-2.4(14)-S4510 (1976).
112. R.C.M. 1947, § 85-405 (Supp. 1977). For a more detailed discussion of these en-
forcement powers, See Swartley, Recent Consumer Protection Developments in Montana, 37
MoNT. L. Rav. 371 (1976).
113. R.C.M. 1947, § 85-414(2) (Supp. 1977).
114. R.C.M. 1947, § 85-414(3) (Supp. 1977).
115. R.C.M. 1947, § 85-406 (Supp. 1977).
116. R.C.M. 1947, § 85-414(1) (Supp. 1977).
117. R.C.M. 1947, § 85-415 (Supp. 1977).
118. R.C.M. 1947, §§ 85-405, 85-509 (Supp. 1977). The appropriate district court is the
district where the alleged violator resides or has his principal place of business, or the Lewis
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lation in the enforcement of the Act, or they can commence and
prosecute actions on their own behalf.'20 By a 1977 amendment to
the Act, the Attorney General of the State of Montana is also au-
thorized to assist in or initiate enforcement of the Act, but his par-
ticipation is conditioned upon the Department of Business Regula-
tion or a county attorney requesting his assistance. 2'
While class actions are specifically prohibited by the Act, 2 a
consumer can bring a private suit for any damages caused by any
unfair or deceptive trade practice. The unfair practice must have
been part of a purchase or lease transaction for personal, family or
household goods or services. The consumer can recover actual dam-
ages, or $200, whichever is greater. In its discretion, the court can
award the consumer treble damages.'2
The Department of Business Regulation is granted broad inves-
tigative powers to investigate alleged violations of the Act. The
department can demand written information or physical evidence,
obtain oral evidence under oath, issue a subpoena, and conduct a
hearing.'24 If a person fails to cooperate with the investigative pro-
cess, the department can obtain an injunction preventing the sale
or advertisement of goods, or the conduct of any business involved
in the alleged violation. The department can also ask that a corpora-
tion's charter be suspended, or that its certificate of authority be
revoked or suspended.' 5
To oversee the enforcement of the Act, the Department of Busi-
ness Regulation has created a consumer affairs division. 6 It has an
administrator, an attorney, and a compliance officer.
B. Door-To-Door Sales Act
Both the federal government'27 and the State of Montana have
119. R.C.M. 1947, § 85-409 (Supp. 1977).
120. R.C.M. 1947, § 85-416 (Supp. 1977). The Missoula County Attorney's office is the
only county attorney's office with a full-time staff member specializing in consumer com-
pliants.
121. R.C.M. 1947, § 85-416 (Supp. 1977). Attorney General Greeley has designated a
member of his staff to handle consumers, so he is apparently ready for the cry for help.
122. R.C.M. 1947, § 85-408(1) (Supp. 1977).
123. R.C.M. 1947, § 85-408 (Supp. 1977). This definition is the typical definition of a
consumer transaction.
124. R.C.M. 1947, § 85-411 (Supp. 1977).
125. R.C.M. 1947, § 85-413(1)(2) (Supp. 1977).
126. From 1973 to 1975, the division received 1,391 complaints, but in about half of the
cases (671), the consumer never followed up on the initial contact with the division. Most of
the complaints were settled without legal action; apparently the involvement of the consumer
affairs division was enough to remedy the situation. During that two-year period, the division
did initiate nine investigative demands on business, entered into three voluntary compliance
agreements, and obtained two permanent injunctions against offending businesses. Be an
Open-Eyed Consumer, A Handbook on Consumer Fraud and Protection (prepared by the
[Vol. 39
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attempted to protect consumers from door-to-door sales contracts
since they are usually the most spontaneous, least mindful agree-
ments made by consumers. To protect consumers from such con-
tracts, the Montana legislature adopted the Door-to-Door Sales Act
in 1973.2s
The Act was amended in 1977 to apply not only to door-to-door
salespersons, but also to sellers who contact consumers by phone,
and sellers who make consumer contacts at a place other than their
place of business.' 9 It does not apply, however, to all door-to-door
and telephone sales. The sale of insurance policies or newspaper
subscriptions are not covered by the Act, for example. 3 " It covers
only goods and services purchased for personal, family and house-
hold use,'3' and costing more than $25."'1
The Act protects the consumer by granting him a "cooling-off"
period. 3 The buyer is given three days to think about his purchase.
He has until midnight of the third business day to cancel. Purchas-
ers who have entered into a contract over the telephone can also
cancel; they can cancel any time prior to signing a contract relating
to the sale.'34 But where the buyer initiates the sales situation, or
personally knows the seller, his business and the goods or services
he sells, the "cooling-off" remedy is not available.' '
The salesperson is required to supply a cancellation statement
to the buyer, following the form suggested by the Federal Trade
Commission or the form requirements given by Montana law.'3 If a
proper form is supplied, the consumer who wants to cancel must
return the form by certified mail." 7 If the salesperson does not pro-
Consumer Affairs Division, Department of Business Regulation), 29 (1976). The division also
participated in an extensive consumer education program, addressing numerous groups and
appearing on several television programs. Id. at 33.
127. The federal law is set out in 16 C.F.R. § 429 (1977). It was promulgated by the
Federal Trade Commission under its authority to prevent unfair and deceptive acts or prac-
tices.
128. Ch. 426, Laws of Montana (1973) (codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 85-501-06 (Supp.
1977)).
129. R.C.M. 1947, § 85-502.1(2) (Supp. 1977). A magazine salesperson who stops a
pedestrian on the street would fall under the law's purview.
130. Id. Again, the traditional definition of a consumer transaction is used.
131. Id.
132. R.C.M. 1947, § 85-402(2)(c)(d) (Supp. 1977).
133. R.C.M. 1947, § 85-501 (Supp. 1977).
134. R.C.M. 1947, § 85-503(1) (Supp. 1977).
135. R.C.M. 1947, § 85-502(a)(b) (Supp. 1977).
136. The Federal Trade Commission rule requires that the salesperson must:
furnish each buyer, at the time he signs the door-to-door sales contract or otherwise
agrees to buy consumer goods or services from the seller, a completed form in
duplicate, captioned "NOTICE OF CANCELLATION," which shall be attached
to the contract or receipt and easily detachable, and which shall contain in ten
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point bold face type the following information and statements in the same lan-
guage, e.g., Spanish, as that used in the contract:
Notice of Cancellation
[enter date of transaction]
(Date)
YOU MAY CANCEL THIS TRANSACTION, WITHOUT ANY PENALTY
OR OBLIGATION, WITHIN THREE BUSINESS DAYS FROM THE ABOVE
DATE.
IF YOU CANCEL, ANY PROPERTY TRADED IN, ANY PAYMENTS
MADE BY YOU UNDER THE CONTRACT OR SALE AND ANY NEGOTIABLE
INSTRUMENT EXECUTED BY YOU WILL BE RETURNED WITHIN 10
BUSINESS DAYS FOLLOWING RECEIPT BY THE SELLER OF YOUR CAN-
CELLATION NOTICE, AND ANY SECURITY INTEREST ARISING OUT OF
THE TRANSACTION WILL BE CANCELED.
IF YOU CANCEL, YOU MUST MAKE AVAILABLE TO THE SELLER AT
YOUR RESIDENCE, IN SUBSTANTIALLY AS GOOD CONDITION AS WHEN
RECEIVED, ANY GOODS DELIVERED TO YOU UNDER THIS CONTRACT
OR SALE: OR YOU MAY IF YOU WISH, COMPLY WITH THE INSTRUC-
TIONS OF THE SELLER REGARDING THE RETURN SHIPMENT OF THE
GOODS AT THE SELLER'S EXPENSE AND RISK.
IF YOU DO MAKE THE GOODS AVAILABLE TO THE SELLER AND
THE SELLER DOES NOT PICK THEM UP WITHIN 20 DAYS OF THE DATE
OF YOUR NOTICE OF CANCELLATION, YOU MAY RETAIN OR DISPOSE
OF THE GOODS WITHOUT ANY FURTHER OBLIGATION. IF YOU FAIL TO
MAKE THE GOODS AVAILABLE TO THE SELLER, OR IF YOU AGREE TO
RETURN THE GOODS TO THE SELLER AND FAIL TO DO SO, THEN YOU
REMAIN LIABLE FOR PERFORMANCE OF ALL OBLIGATIONS UNDER
THE CONTRACT.
TO CANCEL THIS TRANSACTION, MAIL OR DELIVER A SIGNED AND
DATED COPY OF THIS CANCELLATION NOTICE OR ANY OTHER WRIT-
TEN NOTICE, OR SEND A TELEGRAM TO [Name of seller], AT [address of
seller's place of business] NOT LATER THAN MIDNIGHT OF
(date).
I HEREBY CANCEL THIS TRANSACTION,
(Date)
(Buyer's signature)
16 C.F.R. § 429.1(a) (1977).
The Montana law specifies that the seller:
shall furnish the buyer a notice which contains the statement set forth in subsection
(a) or a statement as prescribed by federal trade commission rule governing door-
to-door sales, and printed in capital and lowercase letters of not less than 10-point
boldfaced type with the seller's name and business address and the statement set
forth in subsection (b):
(a) YOU MAY CANCEL THIS SALE WITHIN THREE BUSINESS DAYS.
If you decide within 3 days that you want to cancel the sale, tear off and
mail the bottom of this card. To cancel, the card must be mailed BY
CERTIFIED MAIL within 3 days after you sign the contract.
(date)
(b) CONTRACT CANCELED
I hereby cancel this sale.
(Buyer's signature)
R.C.M. 1947, § 85-504(1) (Supp. 1977).
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vide the required cancellation form, the consumer can use any
means of notification,'38 as long as it is in writing and establishes his
intent to cancel.'39 The writing does not have to be sent by certified
mail,'40 and is considered good notice the minute it is deposited in
the mail with the proper address and postage.'4 '
If the buyer cancels properly, then the seller has ten days to
return any payments made by the buyer, along with any evidence
of indebtedness.'42 If the buyer has traded other goods as a kind of
payment, those goods must be returned in substantially the same
condition. Otherwise, the buyer is entitled to their trade-in value.'
If the seller does not return the above-described payments and
money, the buyer can sue for their return, and if successful, can also
recover $100 plus attorney's fees and costs.' The consumer is also
given a lien on the goods purchased from the salesperson, and can
keep them until the seller returns the consideration paid by the
consumer.'
45
If the seller hands over the consideration, the consumer must
return the goods received under the contract. If the goods cannot be
returned in substantially the same condition as when they were
received, the seller can ignore the cancellation and the consumer
loses all rights under the law.'46 The consumer is not required to
deliver the goods to the seller; it is the seller's responsibility to pick
them up at the buyer's residence."'4 If the seller does not do so within
40 days of cancellation, the goods become the property of the con-
sumer, without obligation to pay for them.'48
To insure that consumers know with whom they are dealing,
and to give them an opportunity to take down the information
needed for cancellation, the salesperson is required to tell the con-
sumer his name, the name of the company he represents, the kind
of goods or services he sells, and a statement that he wishes to sell
to the consumer. If the sales contact is in person, the salesperson
must also show the consumer a business card.' 49 These disclosures
must be made before the salesperson launches into his salespitch.
Most of the information will be provided to the consumer again, if
137. R.C.M. 1947, § 85-504(1) (Supp. 1977).
138. R.C.M. 1947, § 85-504(2) (Supp. 1977).
139. R.C.M. 1947, § 85-503(2) (Supp. 1977).
140. R.C.M. 1947, § 85-504(2) (Supp. 1977).
141. R.C.M. 1947, § 85-503 (Supp. 1977).
142. R.C.M. 1947, § 85-505(1) (Supp. 1977).
143. R.C.M. 1947, § 83-505(2) (Supp. 1977).
144. R.C.M. 1947, § 83-505(3) (Supp. 1977).
145. R.C.M. 1947, § 83-505(4) (Supp. 1977).
146. R.C.M. 1947, § 85-503(5) (Supp. 1977).
147. R.C.M. 1947, § 85-506(1) (Supp. 1977).
148. R.C.M. 1947, § 85-506 (Supp. 1977).
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the salesperson supplies a cancellation card.
If a salesperson fails to follow the provisions of the law, he can
be charged with a violation of the Montana Unfair Trade Practices
and Consumer Protection Act.'50
C. Consumer Reporting Agency Act
As noted earlier in this article, the federal government has been
in the business of regulating consumer reporting agencies since the
passage of the Fair Credit Reporting Act in 1970. Since many report-
ing agencies did not fall under the "interstate" jurisdiction of that
act, however, the State of Montana developed its own regulatory
scheme. The state law, practically a carbon copy of the Fair Credit
Reporting Act, was passed in 1975.'1'
Consumer reporting agencies in Montana are permitted to col-
lect data for two general purposes: (1) the preparation of credit,
insurance and job histories,'52 and (2) the preparation of
"investigative consumer reports," which are assembled by inter-
viewing neighbors, friends and associates about the consumer's
character, reputation, personal characteristics and living habits.'53
The law prohibits the use of these reports except: in response
to a court order; in response to written instructions from the con-
sumer; in response to a customer who wants the information for
credit, employment, insurance underwriting, or governmental li-
censing purposes; and in response to a customer who has a legiti-
mate business need for the information.'54 To insure that the con-
sumer information will be used properly, persons who request the
information from a reporting agency must identify themselves, and
certify that the data will be used for a defined purpose only. '5 The
reporting agencies must also keep a record of all persons who use
their information.1'5
The kind of information that can be assembled and distributed
is also limited. Bankruptcies more than 14 years old and court judg-
ments, paid tax liens, accounts placed for collection or any other
adverse information more than seven years old cannot be included
in the report.'57 If adverse information is collected during the inves-
tigative consumer report process, that information must be verified
149. R.C.M. 1947, § 85-502.2 (Supp. 1977).
150. R.C.M. 1947, § 85-507 (Supp. 1977).
151. Ch. 547, Laws of Montana (1975) (codified at R.C.M. 1947, §§ 18-501 to 521 (Supp.
1977)).
152. R.C.M. 1947, §§ 18-502(4)(a)(i)(ii), 18-504 (Supp. 1977).
153. R.C.M. 1947, § 18-502(5) (Supp. 1977).
154. R.C.M. 1947, § 18-504 (Supp. 1977).
155. R.C.M. 1947, § 18-507(1) (Supp. 1977).
156. R.C.M. 1947, § 18-507(2) (Supp. 1977).
[Vol. 39
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or confirmed before it can be used in a consumer report, except
when the information is a matter of public record.' s
If the information from a consumer reporting agency is used to
deny credit, insurance or employment to a consumer, or is used to
increase the charge for credit or insurance, the consumer must be
told.' 59 The consumer must also be supplied with the name and
address of the reporting agency that supplied the information.' 0
This disclosure must be made by the person who requested and used
the information. The consumer then has the right to go to the re-
porting agency to find out the nature and substance of all informa-
tion on file about him.'"' The sources of that information must also
be revealed.'12 The agency is not required to disclose medical infor-
mation on file, however.13
Information collected by the "investigative consumer report"
method is more closely regulated than credit, insurance and job
history information. If such information is requested for other than
employment purposes, the consumer must be notified by mail
within three days of the request. The person asking for the informa-
tion, not the reporting agency, must make the notification. The
consumer must be told that he can ask for additional information
on the nature, scope, and substance of the investigation.' 4 If the
consumer asks for that additional disclosure,' 5 it must be supplied
to him in writing within five days.' 6
The reporting agency must disclose its information, without
charge to the consumer, if disclosure is being made after denial of
credit, employment, or insurance. In all other instances of disclo-
sure, the agency can charge the consumer up to three dollars for
such service.' 7
If a consumer challenges the completeness or accuracy of infor-
mation on file with an agency, the reporting agency must make a
reinvestigation. If the information cannot be verified, the agency
must correct the error or delete the information. The agency must
157. R.C.M. 1947, § 18-505 (Supp. 1977).
158. R.C.M. 1947, § 18-508 (Supp. 1977).
159. R.C.M. 1947, § 18-515 (Supp. 1977). The consumer can also request disclosure,
even though the information has not been used adversely. R.C.M. 1947, § 18-510(1). A dili-
gent consumer can constantly monitor the information kept on file, to insure its accuracy,
and does not have to wait until some damage is done to him to discover the content of that
information.
160. R.C.M. 1947, § 18-515 (Supp. 1977).
161. R.C.M. 1947, § 18-510(1)(a) (Supp. 1977).
162. R.C.M. 1947, § 18-510(1)(b) (Supp. 1977).
163. R.C.M. 1947, § 18-510(1)(a) (Supp. 1977).
164. R.C.M. 1947, § 18-506 (Supp. 1977).
165. He must do so within a reasonable time of receiving the first request. R.C.M. 1947,
§ 18-506 (Supp. 1977).
166. R.C.M. 1947, § 18-506 (Supp. 1977).
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also notify everyone who has received the information and tell them
of the error or change.' 8 If the reinvestigation does not resolve the
challenge, the consumer can file a brief statement setting out his
side of the dispute.' 9 The statement must be kept in the consumer's
file, and must be included as part of the agency's report on the
consumer. 1
70
If the provisions of the consumer reporting act are not followed,
the consumer can sue for defamation, invasion of privacy, or negli-
gence."' If the noncompliance is willful, the consumer can sue for
actual damages, punitive damages, court costs and attorney's
fees.' The consumer can also bring a damage suit against anyone
who furnishes false information to a reporting agency, if the person
was acting with malice or willful intent.'73
D. Interest Rates
The usury rate in Montana was set at ten percent per annum
in 1919. Ten percent then seemed an unattainable figure. In the
early 1970's, however, when primary interest rates hovered around
9-9.5 percent, the usury limit was no longer so distant. Many banks
and lending institutions were unable to loan money to consumers
because profit margins no longer existed in such transactions.
To remedy the situation, the Montana legislature changed the
usury rate in 1975.' 7  The legislature retained the old ten percent
limit, but it also set up an alternative test to be used when the ten
percent rate is too restrictive.
The new usury limitations are as follows:
a) on loans of up to $150,000, the rate is 10 percent per annum or
no more than 4 percentage points in excess of the discount rate on
90-day commercial paper in effect at the federal reserve bank in
the ninth reserve district, whichever is greater;
b) on loans up to $300,000, the rate is 10 percent or 5 percentage
points in excess of the discount rate on 90-day paper, whichever is
greater;
c) on amounts in excess of $300,000, the parties can agree to any
rate of interest, without limitation.'75
167. A.R.M. § 8-2.4(1)-S4500 (1976). In both circumstances, the consumer has the right
to be accompanied by another person. R.C.M. 1947, § 18-511(4) (Supp. 1977).
168. R.C.M. 1947, § 18-512 (Supp. 1977).
169. R.C.M. 1947, § 18-512(2) (Supp. 1977).
170. R.C.M. 1947, § 18-512(3) (Supp. 1977).
171. R.C.M. 1947, § 18-516(1) (Supp. 1977).
172. R.C.M. 1947, § 18-517 (Supp. 1977).
173. R.C.M. 1947, § 18-516(3) (Supp. 1977).
174. Ch. 503, Laws of Montana (1975) (codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 47-125 (Supp. 1977)).
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The 1977 legislature modified the law governing finance charges
on retail charge accounts.'76 That law now permits the seller to apply
a charge of not more than one and one-half percent per billing period
to the greatest of either:
a) the average daily balance in the account during the period, or
b) the ending balance in the account, less the purchases charged
during the billing period,'" or
c) the median amount within a $10 range within which such aver-
age daily balance or beginning balance falls.'
E. Minimum Wage Law
The United States Congress established a minimum wage and
hour law in 1938 with passage of the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA).'75 The law applied principally to workers employed by in-
terstate businesses. The FLSA protected some Montana workers,
particularly persons working for the larger businesses, but most of
those persons belonged to unions and were already guaranteed a
minimum wage by union contracts with employers. The employees
who most needed wage protection - employees of small businesses
or local Montana corporations - however, were not assured of a
minimum wage until the Montana legislature passed a minimum
wage law in 1971.80 The law was amended in 1975 to further increase
employee protections.'
Besides establishing a minimum wage, the act also established
an overtime provision for workers. Employees who work more than
40 hours in a work week must be paid one and one-half times their
hourly wage.' 2 If an employee is not paid the proper minimum or
overtime wage, he can sue the employer under Montana's wage
claim statutes'3 to recover the higher salary.' 8
The wage law does not cover all intrastate workers. The follow-
ing are exempt: students participating in a distributive education
175. R.C.M. 1947, § 47-125 (Supp. 1977).
176. R.C.M. 1947, § 74-608 (Supp. 1977).
177. Subsection (b) is the new addition to the statute.
178. R.C.M. 1947, § 74-608(4) (Supp. 1977).
179. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 81-393, 63 Stat. 910 (codified as
amended at Ch. 417, Laws of Montana (1971) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-62 (1970)).
180. R.C.M. 1947, §§ 41-2301 to 2307 (Supp. 1977). When it was first passed the mini-
mum wage for employees was $1.20 an hour; it is now $2.00 an hour. While the Montana
legislature has increased the wage standard by 40% since the enactment of the wage law, it
is still well below the federal minimum wage which is presently $2.35 and will soon become
$2.65 an hour.
181. Ch. 421, Laws of Montana (1975) (codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 41-2303 (Supp.
1977)).
182. R.C.M. 1947, § 41-2303(b) (Supp. 1977).
183. R.C.M. 1947, §§ 41-1301-1325 (Supp. 1977).
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program; persons performing menial chores in a private home, ba-
bysitting or yardwork, for example; immediate members of a family,
who are dependent on a family member/employer for half or more
of their support; executive, administrative and professional persons;
apprentices and learners for 30 days, if the Commissioner of Labor
and Industry exempts them; handicapped persons who perform
work as part of a training or evaluation program, or who cannot work
competitively because of their impairment; and anyone employed
by the United States government. 8 5
The provisions of the act also do not cover employees whose
wages are determined by special statutory procedures authorized by
the Montana legislature. This exemption was established by the
Montana supreme court in Billings v. Smith,'8 involving a state
statute that authorized county commissioners to fix the salaries of
deputy sheriffs.'8" The supreme court held that the Montana law did
not require a minimum or overtime wage payment to deputies be-
cause the wage of those employees was determined by a special law
which prevailed over the general provisions of the minimum wage
act.
Some farm workers are also treated differently under the act.
If the farm employee works for a full calender year, the wage law
apparently covers him. But, if the employee works only for part of
a calender year, the employer must compensate the worker at the
minimum rate multiplied by the total number of hours worked dur-
ing the part of the year, or at a rate of $460 a month.' 8
F. Wage Payments
Montana has long had rather specific laws requiring employers
to make wage payments in a timely manner, and providing penal-
ties if the employer fails to do so. 189 In recent years, the legislature
has modified those laws slightly to .protect both employees and em-
ployers.
Before 1975, employers in Montana had to pay their employees
at least twice a month. That requirement was deleted by the 1975
legislature, and now any payment schedule established by the em-
ployment contract is proper. The earned wages must be paid within
10 business days after they become due and payable.'90 Prior to 1975,
184. R.C.M. 1947, § 41-2306 (Supp. 1977).
185. R.C.M. 1947, § 41-2304 (Supp. 1977).
186. 158 Mont. 197 (1971).
187. R.C.M. 1947, § 25-604 (Supp. 1977).
188. R.C.M. 1947, § 41-2303(c)(2) (Supp. 1977).
189. The statutes were first passed in 1919, Ch. 11, Laws of Montana, see, R.C.M. 1947,
§§ 41-1301 to 1330.
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the wages had to be paid within five business days of their due date.
If the wages are not paid within the statutory period, the em-
ployee can collect a penalty payment, assessed at the rate of 5
percent of the unpaid wages for every day the wage is unpaid. The
employee can only collect the penalty for 20 days, since the 20 day
period results in the employee collecting a double wage.'' Before
1973, the employee had six months from the date of default to
collect the penalty payments. The collection period was extended
to eighteen months by the 1973 legislation."'
The 1977 legislature adopted a reciprocal wage collection law
to assist Montana residents in collecting wages from out-of-state
employers.'93 The employee must assign his claim to the Depart-
ment .of Labor and Industry before the wage can be recovered, and
the defaulting employer must also reside in a state that has entered
into a reciprocity agreement for collection of wages with Montana. 9
Such an agreement also permits employers of a cooperating state to
collect wages against Montana employers.' The specific action
taken to collect the wages will depend on the content of the reciproc-
ity agreement itself.'
G. Maternity Leave Law
One of the more controversial and unpopular decisions handed
down by the United States Supreme Court last term was General
Electric Co. v. Gilbert. "I The case held that employers did not
discriminate against their women employees if maternity benefits
were not included in a health program. The decision brought an
immediate outcry from women's groups and many members of Con-
gress. As a result, Congress is presently considering legislation to
nullify the effect of the Supreme Court's ruling. 98
Some employment protections are given to Montana women by
a maternity leave law the state legislature passed in 1975.'"1 The law
declares that no employer, public or private, can terminate a
woman's employment because of her pregnancy.2°° The employer
190. R.C.M. 1947, § 41-1302 (Supp. 1977).
191. Id.
192. R.C.M. 1947, § 41-1304 (Supp. 1977).
193. Ch. 216, Laws of Montana (1977) (codified at R.C.M. 1947, §§ 41-1328 to 1331
(Supp. 1977)).
194. R.C.M. 1947, § 41-1328 (Supp. 1977).
195. R.C.M. 1947, § 41-1330 (Supp. 1977).
196. R.C.M. 1947, §§ 41-1329 to 1331 (Supp. 1977).
197. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
198. The contemplated legislation would require employers who provide disability ben-
efits to treat pregnancy like any other non-work related disability. See H.R. 5057, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1977).
199. Ch. 320, Laws of Montana (1975) (codified at §§ 41-2601 to 2606 (Supp. 1977)).
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also cannot refuse to grant the woman a reasonable leave of ab-
sence,2' deny her any compensation if she is disabled by the preg-
nancy, 20 2 or require her to take an unreasonably long maternity
leave.20 3 After maternity leave, the employer must reinstate the
woman to her original job without interruption of seniority and
benefits, unless he is a private employer and can prove that circum-
stances have changed so that reinstatement is impossible or unrea-
sonable .20
The Commissioner of Labor and Industry is charged with en-
forcement of the act.305 If an employer violates a provision of the act,
the mistreated employee can file a complaint with the commis-
sioner. After an investigation, the commissioner can order reinstate-
ment of the employee and payment of damages growing out of the
violation.2 6 If an aggrieved employee does not want to go through
the commissioner, she can initiate a private action in district court
asking for reinstatement and damages.207
H. Miscellaneous Statutes
Subcontractors' Bonds
Subcontractors are required to obtain a surety bond or other
security to guarantee the payment of their employees' wages.208 Sub-
contractors can obtain one bond per year, and file it with the Com-
missioner of Labor and Industry.20° The bond must be equal to the
subcontractor's average monthly payroll.210 If someone hires a sub-
contractor without a proper bond, the principal contractor becomes
liable for the wages and benefits of the subcontractor's employees.2 1,
200. R.C.M. 1947, § 41-2602(1)(a) (Supp. 1977).
201. R.C.M. 1947, § 41-2602(1)(b) (Supp. 1977).
202. R.C.M. 1947, § 41-2602(1)(c) (Supp. 1977).
203. R.C.M. 1947, § 41-2602(1)(e) (Supp. 1977).
204. R.C.M. 1947, § 41-2602(2) (Supp. 1977).
205. R.C.M. 1947, § 41-2603 (Supp. 1977).
206. R.C.M. 1947, § 41-2603 (Supp. 1977). The Department of Labor and Industry
recently promulgated new regulations on the maternity leave law, and is presently consider-
ing several claims against Montana employers. In announcing the new regulation, the Depart-
ment also released its decision in a claim against Mountain Bell. The decision declared that
women are entitled to benefits during the entire gestation period, and a reasonable time after
birth to permit recovery. Mountain Bell has a health plan for its employees, and the decision
was apparently referring to those company benefits, but the ruling is still a major victory for
supporters of maternity leave and benefit plans for women workers.
207. R.C.M. 1947, § 41-2606 (Supp. 1977).
208. Ch. 208, Laws of Montana (1975) (codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 41-2702(1) (Supp.
1977)).
209. R.C.M. 1947, § 41-2702(2) (Supp. 1977).
210. R.C.M. 1947, § 41-2702(1)(b) (Supp. 1977).
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The bond requirement does not apply to resident subcontractors
with a net worth of more than $50,000.212
Professional Strikebreakers
Since 1975, it has been a crime in Montana to hire a profes-
sional strikebreaker to take the place of an employee involved in a
labor dispute."' It is also a crime to recruit, refer or supply such a
professional to an employer."' A professional strikebreaker is some-
one who customarily and repeatedly offers himself for employment
in a labor dispute."' Employers can hire workers during a strike, but
they must advertise that a strike is in progress and that the employ-
ment offered is in place of employees involved in the labor dispute."
Employment of Aliens
The 1977 Montana Legislature prohibited the employment of
aliens who are not authorized under their visitation status to accept
employment.2 17 Any employer who knowingly hires such an alien is
guilty of a crime, and can be fined up to $300.
Product Safety
Montana has had a Consumer Product Safety Act since 1975.219
The law is not nearly as comprehensive as the federal law, which
tries to monitor and regulate every product on the interstate market
that is dangerous or unsafe.220 The Montana law is limited to the
control of hazardous substances in intrastate commerce. 22 Hazard-
ous substances include those defined as toxic, corrosive, irritating,
flammable or combustible, or radioactive. 2 2 Any toy or other chil-
dren's article that presents an electrical, mechanical or thermal
211. R.C.M. 1947, § 41-2702(2) (Supp. 1977).
212. R.C.M. 1947, § 41-2704(1) (Supp. 1977).
213. R.C.M. 1947, § 41-2502 (Supp. 1977).
214. R.C.M. 1947, § 41-2501 (Supp. 1977).
215. R.C.M. 1947, § 41-2502(2) (Supp. 1977).
216. R.C.M. 1947, § 41-2504 (Supp. 1977).
217. Ch. 56, Laws of Montana (1977) (codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 41-121 (Supp. 1977)).
218. R.C.M. 1947, § 41-121(2) (Supp. 1977).
219. Ch. 394, Laws of Montana (1975) (codified at R.C.M. 1947, §§ 69-7101 to 7103
(Supp. 1977)).
220. Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-81 (Supp. IT 1972).
221. The Montana law appears to be patterned after the Federal Hazardous Substance
Act which was passed by Congress in 1960. Pub. L. No. 86-613, 74 Stat. 372 (codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1261 to 1274 (1970)). That act was also narrow in scope, covering only substances
used in the household. Its provisions are still important, however, and the Consumer Product
Safety Commission has assumed responsibility for enforcement of the acts. See, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1261-62 (Supp. V 1975).
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danger is also hazardous. 23 The Department of Health and Environ-
mental Sciences also has authority, under its rule-making powers,
to declare a substance hazardous." 4 If a substance is hazardous, the
department can regulate its use, labeling and storage, or ban the
product from intrastate commerce.2
222. R.C.M. 1947, § 69-7102(4) (Supp. 1977).
223. R.C.M. 1947, § 69-7102(4)(iv) (Supp. 1977).
224. R.C.M. 1947, § 69-7103 (Supp. 1977).
225. R.C.M. 1947, § 69-7103(4) (Supp. 1977).
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